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Filozofskoga fakulteta  
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Hrvatsko društvo za analitičku filozofiju



Pozivamo Vas na predavanje

## *Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice*

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koje će se održati

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### **Abstract:**

Miranda Fricker's (2007) insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. According to Fricker, for hermeneutical injustice to vanish, a public concept of the target phenomenon has to be developed. I analyze the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice and provide one model of how to fill it. This model is based on taking the experiences of members of marginalized groups seriously and, thus, assigns these experiences the crucial role they deserve. First, I argue that the victims of hermeneutical injustice do possess some conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Next, I outline how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel public concept that is, in principle, graspable and deployable by everyone. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel public concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.